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Historisk tidskrift 126:4 • 2006

Innehåll (Contents) 2006:4

Uppsatser (Articles)

Radikalism som strategi Bondepolitik vid 1800-talets mitt

Jan Christensen

Fulltext (pdf)

Summary

Radicalism as strategy. Peasant politics in the middle of the nineteenth century

In the 1840s, the Swedish liberal left had its major support in the press, but also a strong position in the peasant estate. In the parliamentary session of 1840–1841, the peasant estate would become the first estate to endorse the demands for parliamentary reform raised by the liberal opposition. In addition to demanding the abolition of the parliament of estates and the introduction of joint elections, the peasant estate recommended a unicameral legislature and a democratisation of the franchise following Norwegian model. The peasant estate represented by far the largest constituency of the four estates – by mid-nineteenth century about 200 000 freeholders, compared to around 1 200 nobles, 1 500 clergymen, and 30 000 burghers – but was nevertheless not a popular representative assembly.

Only about 5 percent of the total population held voting rights at this time. The majority of the representatives in the peasant estate belonged to the agrarian middle class and represented the interests of small property holders. The turn to a more radical position was brought about by frustration over the failure to reform the existing political system in general and constitutionally guaranteed estate privileges in particular. Constitutional guarantees made the abolition of the nobility’s land privileges virtually impossible.

After the Diet of 1834–1835, the peasant estate concluded that the entire political system had to be radically reshaped in order to reform the land tax. Thus, the peasant estate was driven to adopt a radical position not because of ideological conviction but because of political interests. The estate hoped it would gain greater influence over economic policy by such a strategy. Parliamentary reform would not take place before 1865, however. Prime Minister Louis De Geer won the support of the peasant estate for a bicameral legislature by offering favourable census rules for freeholders. But despite the parliamentary reform, the coveted land tax reform was delayed. This time, however, it was not the noble estate but the Upper House that stopped demands for tax reform by means of its veto power

Keywords

the four estates, parliamentary reform, peasant radicalism, Norwegian peasant democracy, liberalism